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what people are writing about

BOOKS

The Executive’s New Computer:
Six Keys to Systems Success by
Oliver Wight, Reston Publishing
Company, Inc. (a Prentice-Hall
company), Reston, Virginia 22070,
1972, 182 pages, $10.95.

In this lively attack on the cult
of computer sophistication a con
sultant debunks operations re
search, integrated systems, and
some other misused terms with
humor, common sense, and some
harsh words for systems managers
and consultants.

No one familiar with electronic
data processing could possibly dis
agree with the principal thesis of
Oliver Wight’s book, namely, “Sys
tems are tools for the manager, not
toys for the technician.” Some of his
other themes are more controver
sial:
“The notion that the development
of ‘Totally Integrated Management
Information Systems’ should be a
primary goal for many companies
. . . is absurd. It is also foolish to
assume that the best solution to
most companies’ problems is to ‘de
sign a simulation model of the busi
ness.’ One of the classical misdirec
tions of the early years of the
computer age was oversophistica

tion. We have learned—the hard
way—that scientific management has
not usually been the real payoff
application. Most of the payoffs to
day are in the areas of ‘massive
manipulations of data.’ And the
most successful systems are the
ones that are designed to support
—not supplant—the activities of
people.”
Some of these assertions would
be challenged by many data proc
essing people. How often, for ex
ample, do we read that the real
potential of the computer is in mak
ing management more scientific?
Yet Wright’s arguments have an
aura, at least, of having been writ
ten from experience.

REVIEW EDITORS

In order to assure comprehensive coverage of magazine
articles dealing with management subjects, Management
Adviser has arranged with fifteen universities offering the
Ph.D. degree in accounting to have leading magazines in
the field reviewed on a continuing basis by Ph.D. candi
dates under the guidance of the educators listed, who
serve as the review board for this department of Manage
ment Adviser. Unsigned reviews have been written by
members of the magazine’s staff.
Jim G. Ashburn, The University of Texas, Austin
Thomas J. Burns. The Ohio State University, Columbus
Leonard A. Doyle, University of California, Berkeley
William Felix, University of Washington, Seattle

54

Ernest I. Hanson, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Dale S. Harwood, Jr., University of Oregon, Eugene
Daniel Jensen, University of Illinois, Urbana
Walter B. Meigs, University of Southern California, Los
Angeles
John H. Myers, Indiana University, Bloomington
Carl L. Nelson, Columbia University, New York
Hugo Nurnberg, Michigan State University, East Lansing
James W. Pattillo, Louisiana State University, Baton
Rouge
Michael Schiff, New York University, New York
Williard E. Stone, University of Florida, Gainesville
Rufus Wixon, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia

Management Adviser

His name is not exactly a house
hold word. Perhaps in awareness
of that fact, “in this day of the
instant authority and self-appointed
expert,” Mr. Wight takes pains to
spell out his background for the
reader. He says he spent nine years
in production and inventory control
with the Raybestos Division of Ray
bestos-Manhattan, three and a half
years as a corporate production
control consultant to the 13 divi
sions of the Stanley Works, and
three years as an industry educa
tion manager in the manufacturing
industries marketing department of
IBM before becoming an independ
ent consultant. Whether or not he
qualifies as a general “computer
systems expert” (a term that he
himself ridicules), he does seem to
have had experience in the appli
cation of computers to manufactur
ing. For that reason, and because,
he says, production and inventory
management is the field “with the
biggest payoff potential in most
manufacturing companies,” all his
examples are drawn from that field.
Mr. Wight starts off with the
now-familiar assertion, made by
McKinsey & Company and others,
that most computer systems simply
have not paid off for the companies
that installed them. He states it
more strongly than most: “. . . even
today, most executives don’t realize
how bad the situation really is . . .
The truth is that the number of
companies actually getting a payoff
from computers represents a very,
very small percentage of the total
that have tried.” These statements,
he cheerfully admits, “like most
others in this book . . . are based
on my knowledge of computer ap
plications in manufacturing com
panies.”
Mr. Wight lists six major rea
sons for computer systems failure:
“1. System too sophisticated and
ambitious.
“2. Application not sound.
“3. Systems people assumed—and
management abdicated—responsi
bility for system design.
“4. Designed to supplant—not
support—the user.
May-June, 1972

“5. Optimistic implementation.
“6. Company incapable of man
aging with a system.”
Of these six reasons, he thinks,
Reason 6, “inability to manage with
a system—is really the most univer
sal problem. Today, few companies
do enough other things right to al
low one to judge whether or not
they could have managed with
their system.”
This is a provocative thought, but
it is, unfortunately, one of the least
developed themes in the book. Per
haps 182 pages were just not
enough to tell a company how to
prepare itself for systematization of
its management. Or perhaps it is
simply easier to attack than to be
positive. (The book as a whole
shows clearly that Mr. Wight, like
most critics, found it easier to be
clever and striking when accentu
ating the negative.)
Reason 1, on the other hand, is
very well developed. Mr. Wight
does a scathing—and rather con
vincing-job of attacking overso
phistication.
The most successful systems, he
says, tend to be essentially simple.
“When systems are too sophisticated
the user does not understand them
and tends either to follow them
blindly or ignore them completely
and develop his own informal sub
systems.”
He criticizes, for example, at
tempts to optimize the lot-size
mathematically by various calcula
tions involving the forecast of fu
ture demand, the item’s unit cost,
machine setup cost, and inventory
carrying cost. “Forecasts are usually
wrong, by definition. Unit costs and
machine setup costs (if available)
are approximations at best. Almost
no one claims to know what it
really costs in total to carry inven
tory; we can only estimate a rea
sonable figure. But isn’t it fun to
develop a formula that can massage
an error and an approximation and
an estimate to get precise results!”
In the course of his attack on
sophistication (a bad word to Mr.
Wight) the author bears down hard
on operations research, “no longer

in vogue,” and its practitioners.
“Too many operations researchers
have found it much more entertain
ing to communicate with each other
rather than to communicate with
managers who have forgotten most
of the calculus they ever knew.
They have also often found devel
oping elegant solutions to trivial
problems more challenging than
working on the real business prob
lems. They start out with the as
sumption that the solution is going
to be a complex mathematical one
and often develop elaborate inven
tory models that are difficult to
apply in a company where the
managers have not yet figured out
how to keep the inventory-on-hand
balance record correct.”
He also bears down on consult
ants (including those from CPA
firms), systems managers, and com
puter salesmen, all of whom, partly
because of self-interest, partly be
cause of the customs of their own
worlds, have become, he says, part
of the “conspiracy for sophistica
tion.”
The real test of value, according
to Mr. Wight, is not the computer’s
ability to handle added sophistica
tion, but the user’s. He suggests
these tests of “systems value anal
ysis”:
“1. Will it really be more effec
tive or is it primarily intellectually
appealing?
“2. When considering the func
tion and significance of this element
in the real world, is this an area
that is worth really fine tuning?
“3. Identify the last 20 per cent
of sophistication that will generate
80 per cent of the system cost and
confusion.
“4. What will the extra sophisti
cation cost in user understanding of
this part of the system? Of the over
all system?
“5. Is there a simpler way to do
it?”
Mr. Wight does have other con
structive suggestions to make be
sides, “Keep it simple.” Although
the negative sections of his book
are much wittier and much more
memorable, he does have some
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good ideas to offer about how to
pick the areas of profitable applica
tion for the computer and about
who should design EDP systems
and how.
His six keys to systems success,
given in an appendix, are the in
verse of his six reasons for failure.
In other appendices he offers check
lists of systems shibboleths, man
agement shibboleths, and questions
and answers for determining payoff
application.
Like many a book that apparent
ly grew out of a successful speech,
this one attracts more attention by
its boldly negative statements than
by its positive ideas. When he is
put under obligation to be positive,
Mr. Wight has a tendency to fade
away in generalities.
Even so, this is a book that ably
represents the viewpoint of the so
phisticated (pardon the term) com
puter user. As such, it should be
read by every computer manager,
salesman, and consultant.

Business Planning and Policy
Formulation by Robert J. Mock

Appleton-Century-Crofts, New
York, 1972, 124 pages, $8.95.

ler,

A primer on business planning,
this book is an attempt at a com
prehensive outline of what plan
ning and policy development are,
how they are related, and how they
are carried out in a business.

Long-range planning is one of
the newer fads in management. In
1962 the Stanford Research Insti
tute found only a “tiny” number of
companies with fully developed
and staffed long-range planning
programs. By 1967 more than half
of the 45 major corporations in
cluded in another study had longrange planning departments.
That is not to say that in all cases
these companies know what they
are doing. Indeed, says Professor
Mockler, there is a good deal of
confusion among business man
agers as to exactly what planning
and policy development are and
56

how they are performed. A par
ticular problem has been failure to
define adequately the relation be
tween planning and policy develop
ment, which has often resulted in
failure to integrate policies effec
tively with overall company objec
tives and strategies.
That is the rationale behind this
book. There are many books on
planning and many on policy de
velopment, but few, this author
feels, that deal with both in proper
relationship to each other. He has
tried to write a concise, practical,
unifying summary that covers busi
ness planning theory, procedures
for planning at all levels in a stepby-step approach, ways to apply
the approach in various business
situations, and guidelines for de
veloping policies within this frame
work.
Professor Mockler starts by pre
senting a basic business planning
process or model applicable to all
levels and kinds of planning situa
tions and explaining how it is re
lated to the process of problem
solving and decision making. He
distinguishes and discusses two
kinds of business planning: stra
tegic planning for overall planning
direction and implementation plan
ning to execute these directions.
He develops guidelines for using
the business planning process at
various levels of management and
in various functions and examines
the interrelationships among them
in a variety of business situations.
Then he explains the place of pol
icy development within the plan
ning process and sets forth guide
lines for developing policies based
on strategic planning.
Additional chapters deal with
some of the newer tools of man
agement such as operations re
search, information systems, and
electronic data processing; organi
zation planning; and special prob
lems of planning in small business.
The conclusion summarizes the
work of other writers in the field.
The appendix contains several case
studies, some hypothetical ones
from the files of the Harvard Busi
ness School and some actual ones

from previously published works as
well as some company policy state
ments. These and other case studies
are also used extensively in the text
for illustrative purposes. The most
interesting examples, however,
come from the author’s own experi
ence with circulation planning for
The National Observer.
Although written primarily as a
text for college courses in “business
policy,” this book has value for the
businessman who is uneasily con
scious that he is not doing enough
planning—or who is simply curious
to know what long-range planning
is all about.

The Repurchase of Common
Stock by Charles D. Ellis and

Allan E. Young, The Ronald Press
Company, New York, 1971, 212
pages, $12.
Repurchase by corporations of
their own common shares has
reached such a scale in recent years
that it has become a significant
factor both in the securities markets
and in corporate financial manage
ment. These authors examine the
why and how of the phenomenon
and its implications.

In the 1950s and 1960s compa
nies repurchased a growing quan
tity of their common stock. In 1965
nearly $2 billion was spent for this
purpose by companies listed on the
New York Stock Exchange, substan
tially more than the $1.5 billion
received by all U.S. corporations
through the sale of common stock
in that year. This was the second
year in which the net effect of cor
porate activity on the capital mar
kets was to supply equity capital to
these markets rather than, as is more
traditional, to demand funds from
them. The trend seems to have lev
eled off in the 1970s, but the vol
ume remains significant.
In this book the authors, a vice
president of Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette, Inc., and a professor at
Syracuse University, provide a
scholarly analysis of this trend.
Management Adviser

Their primary focus is naturally the
effect upon the securities markets,
but they also devote ample space
to the implications of this practice
for financial management, the topic
with which financial executives are
chiefly concerned.
Many possible reasons for stock
repurchase are suggested by the
authors. The fact that stock repur
chase has been growing at a faster
rate than expenditures for the pay
ment of dividends or for gross addi
tions to plant and equipment sug
gests to them that tax laws may
have led companies to seek to dis
tribute profits through this mech
anism rather than through divi
dends. Corporate dividend payouts
have generally declined since 1954,
supporting the thesis that compa
nies have sought to channel profits
to stockholders in a tax-favored
way.
High interest rates factor

Since 1959 the availability of in
ternally generated funds has ex
ceeded expenditures for dividends
and for plant and equipment by an
increasing margin. Thus, “largescale repurchases by corporations
of their own common stock consti
tuted a natural response on the
part of financial management to
the need to develop new uses of
corporate funds. . . . From 1961 on,
when the extent of the excess of
sources over uses began to grow
at an increasing rate and to reach
significant proportions, it was nec
essary to avoid a buildup of in
creasing amounts in liquid lowearning or non-earning assets be
cause of the effect this would have
on the overall rate of return on
total assets.”
High interest rates also have
been a factor. Corporations can in
crease their financial leverage with
out issuing high-interest debt or
calling in low-interest debt if they
reduce their equity capitalization
through repurchase of common
stock.
And the increasing emphasis on
earnings per share has influenced
financial management to take this
May-June, 1972

measure as a guide. One way, of
course, to increase earnings per
share is simply to decrease the
number of shares.
Other, more specific, reasons
have influenced specific manage
ments at particular times. Founda
tions (such as the Ford Founda
tion) closely tied to particular
companies have diversified their
holdings without driving down the
price of the stock by selling shares
back to the issuing company. The
growing trend to issue convertible
securities has led companies to ac
quire reserves of common shares
with which to accomplish conver
sions. Other companies have bought
up their own shares for future use
in merger transactions and to pro
vide a supply of stock to maintain
stock option and employee stock
purchase plans. Some have simply
sought to reduce stock servicing
costs by buying out small share
holders, since the cost of servicing
a stockholder is relatively constant
however many shares he owns.
This trend has not gone on with
out criticism. A number of argu
ments have been voiced against re
purchasing; the authors identify
five major ones:
• Financial “classicists” generally
recommend repurchase “only as a
means of gradually liquidating a
deteriorating company or one with
wasting assets.”
• Buying in common stock, for
some, has “the unfavorable conno
tation of defeatism and implies that
a management not finding ways to
use surplus funds is inept and dullwitted.”
• There is still a widespread
management preference for equity
over debt capital, although the au
thors consider this preference irra
tional in many cases.
• Many warn against the possi
bility of abuses of the ability to
repurchase shares—battles over con
trol, manipulated share prices, etc.
• Some have argued that either
the sellers of repurchased stock or
the remaining holders must be hurt
by a repurchase transaction and
that management should not help

some stockholders at the expense
of others.
All five of these arguments
against repurchase the authors find
“quite general, often vague, and
usually suggestive of possible prob
lems rather than descriptive of ac
tual difficulties. On the other hand,
the reasons advanced in favor of
repurchasing are pragmatic and
specific.”
The authors go on to examine
repurchasing techniques and pro
cedures, the legal and regulatory
constraints that bear upon the re
purchase decision, and the account
ing aspects of repurchasing. Finally,
they consider the impact of largescale repurchasing upon the effi
cient operation of the capital mar
kets and upon the movement of
security prices. They weigh the
benefits and abuses of repurchasing
in terms of the public interest and
make suggestions for public policy.
This is a timely and scholarly
study of an important topic. Ac
countants, and financial executives
as well as professionals in the mar
ket should find it both useful and
interesting.
[See “Practical Considerations in
Common Stock Repurchase,” page
35, this issue.]

SAFE: Security Audit and Field
Evaluation for Computer Facili
ties and Information Systems by

Leonard I. Krauss, Firebrand,
Krauss & Company, Inc., P.O. Box
165, East Brunswick, New Jersey
08816, 1972, 284 pages, $24.95.

This little looseleaf manual con
sists chiefly of a set of forms for
use in evaluating EDP security.

Despite the headlines given to
bombings of computer rooms, for
the average computer user security
involves attention to more mundane
concerns: accidental or malicious
destruction of computer facilities
or computerized records; lawsuits
and loss of revenue and goodwill
resulting from computer error;
fraud and embezzlement; industrial
57

espionage; and the problems of
negligence and human error.
This manual outlines a procedure
for evaluating security on all these
fronts and presents a set of forms—
in checklist style—for evaluating ex
isting systems in eight classifica
tions: personnel; physical security;
data, programs, and documentation;
operations; backup; development;
insurance; and security program
ing. The checklists, in questionnaire
form, also provide a weighting sys
tem for measuring the degree of
computer safety.
Sufficient forms are provided to
evaluate one complete EDP instal
lation. Additional copies can be or
dered for use in other installations
or for follow-up audits.
Useful basis

Probably only the smallest com
puter user would want to use this
book as is for a computer security
audit. Many, however, including
consultants, may find it useful as
a basis for working out their own
systems. The material, the author
points out, lends itself to tailoring.
Since the solutions to problems un
covered by the audit are not neces
sarily self-evident, the author also
suggests use of consultants in plan
ning for corrective action.
Preparation of this book was an
ingenious idea. It would prove in
valuable to a data processing man
ager or consultant seeking to pre
pare his own first audit.

Measurement and Environmental
Deterioration by Boyd Collier,
Bureau of Business Research, The
University of Texas at Austin, 1971,

100 pages, $3 (paperbound).
This little monograph, a proposal
for a new way of setting up na
tional income accounts, is directed
more to economists than to accoun
tants. However, accountants who
agree with the author that eco
nomics could benefit from closer
contact with accounting may find
it interesting.
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Socio-economic accounting has
become a popular term in recent
years. The author of this little re
search study invokes it to buttress
his proposal for a change in the
current method of calculating the
national income and product ac
counts—a change that would, he
says, bring accounting and econom
ics together, with benefit to both.
The current national income ac
counts, this author says, are out
moded because they are based on
the theory of perfect competition.
He offers, instead, a rough outline
of another method, which includes
many activities now omitted from
national income (i.e., the unpaid
work of housewives) and which in
troduces the idea of disproduct, or
negative product. The basic system
of valuation used is that developed
by John Dewey; the attempt is to
view the economy as a “cybernetic
system.”
Dr. Collier’s would-be system is
not really developed enough for the
Government’s economists to take it
over as a substitute for the present
one, even if they were minded to.
Some of his ideas are provocative,
however, and his attempt to find
common ground between econom
ics and accounting is a worthy one.

Computers in Knowledge-Based
Fields by Charles A. Myers, The
MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachu
setts, 1971, 136 pages, $10 (cloth
bound), $2.95 (paperbound).

This little report reviews the use
of computers in five non-business
fields: education, libraries, the law,
medicine, and local data banks.

This study is the last in a series
of research projects (see M/A Sep
tember-October, ’71, p. 57) on the
implications of technological change
and automation undertaken by the
Industrial Relations Section of the
Sloan School of Management at
MIT in an effort supported by the
Ford Foundation and others.
The report takes a quick look at
the progress made through 1969 by

applying computers in five specific
areas outside business: formal edu
cation and educational administra
tion; library systems and subsys
tems; legal, legislative, and related
services; medical and hospital ser
vices; and national and centralized
local data banks.
Little original research

The result basically is not much
more than a condensed transcript
of material that could have been
received from a press clipping ser
vice. Various applications in each
field are described briefly. Each is
allotted space in apparent propor
tion to the amount of published
material the researchers had about
it rather than in proportion to its
importance.
The exceptions are applications
in or near Boston; there, apparent
ly, the budget allowed for some
research, and they are reviewed in
some detail. Applications outside
Boston get a sentence or two each,
sometimes with a note to the effect
that the current status of the proj
ect is not known.
Nearly as much space is devoted
to the conclusions as to the infor
mation, and the conclusions are
completely predictable (as well as
being nearly identical in all cases):
Some, but not much, progress has
been made with computers in all
these fields. Predictions of revolu
tionary change continue to be
made, but their realization seems
to be remote. Progress has been
held back by economic factors and
by the conservatism of profession
als in the various fields. These pro
fessionals, however, will not be dis
placed but rather will be helped
by computerization if it ever comes.
Useful in specific areas

This rather casual research ef
fort contains nothing that people
who keep up with the fields con
cerned do not already know. It
might be of value in supplying
leads for further investigation to
someone newly concerned about
the use of computers in a particu
Management Adviser

lar area, for example, a consultant
with his first hospital or library
client.
Briefly listed

An Introduction to the Theory
of Statistics by R. L. Plackett,

Barnes & Noble, Inc., New York,
1972, 204 pages, $5.50 (paper
bound).
Designed as a first textbook in
mathematical statistics at the col
lege level, this British import also
might be suitable for review by
the accountant or businessman
whose mathematics has rusted a
bit. In addition to the essentials—
probability theory, discrete and
continuous probability distribu
tions, properties of variates, calcu
lus of distributions, random sam
ples, and statistical inference—the
author includes some other tech
niques he considers most useful in
practice—variance analysis, regres
sion analysis, and frequency analy
sis.
Motivation and Management De
velopment by Robert E. Tenne

Auerbach Publishers Inc.,
Princeton, New Jersey, 1970, 207
pages, $9.50.
hill,

The development of managers
should be based on the concept of
teaching and leading the staff in
an environment conducive to learn
ing, according to this author, a
consultant in this field. He deals
with such questions as how to cre
ate a motivational climate, how to
improve communications, and how
to develop a more constructive at
titude toward learning and skill im
provement among staff members.
Readings on the Current Social
Issues in Business. Fred Lu
thans and Richard M. Hodgetts
(Editors), The Macmillan Com
pany, New York, 1972, 312 pages,
$5.25 (paperbound).

This collection of 34 articles by 31
authors emphasizes the social re
sponsibilities of business, particu
May-June, 1972

larly in the areas of poverty, civil
rights, ecology, and consumerism.
Specific topics include the philoso
phical and ethical foundations of
business, the corporate form of or
ganization, the urban crisis, em
ployment of minorities, and man
power programs.

but can be used independently.

Discrete Optimization: Integer
Programming and Network An
alysis for Management Decisions
by Donald R. Plane and Claude
McMillan, Jr., Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey
07632, 1971, 247 pages, $13.50.

This book aimed at line managers
as well as training directors, em
phasizes the how as well as the
why of supervisory training and
development. The author examines
the latest research and writing and
offers guidelines buttressed by
case studies. A section on selection
of potential foremen and supervi
sors is included. The book is spon
sored by the American Society for
Training and Development.

Books abound on linear program
ing, from those at the most ad
vanced level to those at the most
primitive level. This is not true of
integer programing. That is the
reason for this book, an attempt to
provide students of managerial an
alysis and other nonmathematicians
with an introduction to integer
programing. The mathematical
background required is “quite
modest” (no calculus or matrix
algebra), but the book does require
a willingness on the part of the
reader “to use symbols, algebra,
and ordinary reasoning.” Under
standing of linear programing is as
sumed, but an appendix is pro
vided to bridge the gap if there is
one.
Interviewing Skills for Super
visory Personnel by Lawrence L.
Steinmetz, Addison-Wesley Pub
lishing Company, Inc., Reading,
Massachusetts 01867, 180 pages,
$4.95 (paperbound).

Aimed at managers and supervisors,
this book outlines the basic types
of interviews (information gather
ing, information giving, and prob
lem solving) and some of the basic
techniques (directed, nondirected,
and stress interviews). Guidelines
are provided for employment inter
views, counseling situations, disci
plinary interviews, performance ap
praisal and review conferences, and
exit interviews. The book was de
signed as a companion to a film
strip series on interviewing skills

A Practical Guide for Supervis
ory Training and Development
by Donald L. Kirkpatrick, Addi

son-Wesley Publishing Company,
Inc., Reading, Massachusetts 01867,
1971, 182 pages, $8.50.

Meeting the Challenge of Super
vision by Merle C. Nutt, Exposi
tion Press, Inc., 50 Jericho Turn
pike, Jericho, New York 11753,

1972, 297 pages, $10.
Aimed at the first-line supervisor,
this book tries to cover everything
a supervisor should know: attri
butes of a good supervisor, delega
tion of authority and responsibility,
decision making techniques, human
relations, motivations, incentives,
dealing with unions (bargaining,
grievances, arbitration), safety, and
employee development. There is a
chapter on problems of the con
struction industry.
Early Retirement Programs, Con

ference Board Report Number 532,
The Conference Board, Inc., New
York, 1971, 42 pages $5 (paper
bound), ($1 to Conference Board
associates, students, and teachers).

This report of industry practice is
based on a survey of 841 pension
plans of 641 manufacturers. Topics
covered include eligibility for early
retirement, benefits, early retire
ment experience, age and service
requirements, company-consent re
quirements, comparative benefit
levels, supplements, early retire
ment rates, and trends.
59

MAGAZINES
MIS Is a Mirage by John Dearden,
Harvard Business Review, JanuaryFebruary, 1972.

The title of the article tells part,
but not all, of the story. Professor
Dearden methodically attacks the
premise of a viable, company-wide,
centralized information system but
then he suggests a plan that could
largely reach its objectives.
The thesis of the article is that
each functional area of a typical
company is so different in nature
from each of the others that it is
impossible to create one universal
information system meeting the
needs of all of them. If the term
MIS were taken to mean only those
information systems that are com
puter-based, Professor Dearden
would have no quarrel with it, but
he points out that most people
mean something far more all-em
bracing when they use the term
MIS.
MIS within each function

Each functional area of the com
pany does have its own MIS for its
particular area, he says; if it’s a
healthy company each has inter
faces with the other areas where
needed basic information is ex
changed. Using the automobile in
dustry as an example, he suggests
the development and introduction
of a new car model as an example
of various functional information
systems within specific areas—styl
ing, engineering, product planning,
finance, facility planning, procure
ment, and production schedulingeach doing its own job and still ex
changing the information needed
by each of the other functions at
the proper time. The system works
well within a strict time frame but
it is not in any sense a centralized
management information system,
Professor Dearden insists.
Devising a centralized manage
ment information system—as the
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phrase is generally understood—
simply demands too much expertise
in too many fields, he believes. The
information needs of the financial
accounting and control system are
entirely different from those of the
marketing system just as market
ing’s information needs are entirely
different from those of legal serv
ices, industrial relations, and public
relations. R&D has data needs
unknown in other areas. It is too
much to expect one man to be ex
pert in all these areas.
Why not pool knowledge?

All right, then. Why not have a
group of experts, one from each
area, pool their knowledge to cre
ate an overall system?
Because it would increase the
problems of coordination of infor
mation, Professor Dearden asserts.
The information systems for such
complex functions as marketing
and production would be the re
sponsibility of the staff group
rather than the line executives who
must actually manage marketing
and production; “. . . if any of the
MIS people are competent to tell
the functional experts what to do,
they should be in the functional
area,” the author asserts.
That sentence becomes the focus
of his recommendations. The prin
cipal cause of dissatisfaction with
present information systems is that
they have incompetent or ineffec
tive people in charge of them, Dr.
Dearden believes. If they are re
trained or replaced, the most seri
ous management information prob
lems would disappear, he believes.
He suggests that any company
really worried about its internal in
formation system ask itself these
questions:
Is there adequate communication
between individual groups at all
important interfaces?
Does each group involved in an
interface know enough about the
other interfacing systems to do its
job effectively?
Professor Dearden then recom
mends a group of semi-autonomous
information systems for a com

pany’ organization. A central com
puter group would have control
over all computer-based informa
tion systems. The controller, the
treasurer, the computer and sys
tems group, the legal office, the
industrial relations office, and or
ganization planning would each re
port to an administrative vice pres
ident, who would coordinate their
activities, and serve as a transfer
point for information that each of
them needs from the others. The
marketing, manufacturing, and
R&D functions would continue to
be independent and responsible for
their own information systems.
Thus, in his ideal company, each
function would continue to have
its own information system, with
interfaces among the functions re
porting to the administrative vice
president under that officer’s direc
tion.
In other words, the emphasis
throughout would be on people,
skilled people, and information
checkpoints or interfaces between
functional areas. Dr. Dearden sums
up the main recommendation of his
article in the sentence:
“Place competent people in each
of the formal information systems.”

A Unified Approach to the
Theory of Accounting and In
formation Systems by Claude S.

Colantoni, Rene P. Manes, and
Andrew Whinston, The Account
ing Review, January, 1971.

Most approaches to the design of
accounting information systems
have concentrated on either in
creasing the efficiency of computer
usage through modification of the
double-entry system or the exten
sion of conventional accounting sys
tems to include more diversified in
formation. In this article the
authors suggest a binary coding
and storage technique which pro
vides both efficient computer usage
and multidimensional data files.
Every individual event of de
cision-making relevance to a firm
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may be assumed to be sufficiently
described by a subset C’ of a finite
set of characteristics, C = c1, c2,
. . .cn }. For example, a raw ma
terial purchase might be described
by quantity, date, supplier, amount
paid, material type, etc., while a
customer complaint would be de
scribed by a different selection of
characteristics. For each type of
transaction, each characteristic
from the universal set of n charac
teristics is either relevant or not
relevant. This leads to a unique
binary code for every transaction
type; this binary code can be con
verted to a decimal equivalent. An
event having K decision-relevant
characteristics would be described
by K + 1 ordered elements, as fol
lows:

(Characteristic code, XJ} X2,...Xk),
where X, is the value of the first
relevant characteristic, etc. This al
lows multi-dimensional description
of events without requiring that
each event be described in the
same n-dimensional space.
Given a data base organized in
the above manner, a generalized
definition of an account is formu
lated. If S is the set of possible
account codes, then an account is
simply a subset of S. By a slight
extension, a chart of accounts is
defined as a partition of S. In this
manner it is possible to define a
conventional double-entry chart of
accounts, but other groupings may
also be defined as required.
The authors then discuss a few
important matters of implementa
tion. First, they indicate how data
coded as above might be stored ac
cording to a tree-like structure, pro
viding efficient retrieval based on
the presence or absence of given
characteristics. They then discuss
the possibility of data links be
tween recorded events. For ex
ample, a cash receipt could be
linked to a related sale on account,
or all occurrences of a particular
characteristic could be linked. Fin
ally, they show how an easy-to-use
retrieval language (“key algebra”)
could be developed. A few cost and
benefit issues are discussed in gen
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eral terms, but no attempt is made
to show the feasibility of the pro
posed system under practical con
ditions.
This is not a how-to-do-it article.
Practical issues are discussed in
general terms or are omitted en
tirely. What the authors have done
is to provide a stimulating frame
work for thinking about the prob
lems of information coding, storage,
and retrieval. On this basis it is
well worth the time of a “practical”
man.
Robert W. Hill
University of Southern California

Making Management by Objec
tives Work by R. Stuart-Katzke,

Canadian Chartered Accountant,
October, 1971.
The implementation of a man
agement by objectives system is
most successful when the organiza
tion has been prepared for the
significant change from an em
phasis on inputs to an emphasis on
outputs. A case study of imple
mentation of an MBO system is
also reported.
Management by objectives is de
fined as “a system of management
which focuses on the outputs of
managerial positions.” The MBO
managerial system requires man
agers to establish objectives before
they initiate the action to reach
these objectives. In contrast, often
the general pattern of management
may be to focus on immediate
problems and spend little time on
planning for the future. Under
MBO, the objectives are establish
ed at each organizational level by
superior-subordinate meetings at
the beginning of each period. The
success of the objective-setting
meeting is dependent upon the
agreement to objectives which are
mutually satisfying to both parties.
Individual responsibility for objec
tives must be clear and each in
dividual must have the necessary
authority to perform the actions re
quired to attain the objective. If

these two characteristics do not
exist at the subordinate’s level then
the goal is unrealistic and the use
of the goal as an evaluative means
at the end of the period is useless.
The author notes an effective
MBO program can benefit an or
ganization in a number of ways:
(1) it focuses managerial effort on
a common point by establishing
and directing managerial objectives
from the top down, leading to a
greater unity of purpose and effort
in the organization; (2) it provides
a framework for coordinated effort
among managers by preventing
overlapping objectives and, there
fore, eliminating many of the de
structive forms of competition be
tween different segments of the
business; (3) it provides objective
reward criteria by relating rewards
to the successful attainment of ob
jectives; (4) it clarifies responsibil
ity lines for the individuals in the
managerial system; (5) it points out
organization development needs by
the rapid feedback on problem
areas; and (6) it benefits individual
managers by the knowledge of the
criteria used in evaluating their
performance.
A major cause of failure of MBO
to realize its potential benefits has
been the improper advance pre
paration of the organization. Man
agement often has not treated
MBO as a significant organizational
change and has instead attempted
to force the change upon its or
ganization. The author states that
“unfreezing” a frozen or rigid or
ganization prior to change and “re
freezing” or reinforcing the new set
of values after the change can eli
minate many of the reasons for
failure. Other reasons for failure
include: (1) the use of MBO solely
as an appraisal system and not as
a planning system; (2) a lack of
commitment to MBO at the top
management level; (3) the failure
to relate the reward structure to
outputs; and (4) a low level of trust
between the superior and the sub
ordinate which will prohibit a frank
discussion of goals in the objective
setting meeting.
The management team of in
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dividuals from all levels of the or
ganization must be given time to
adjust to the new system and prac
tice the techniques of interaction
and communication so essential to
the effective implementation and
operation of the MBO system. The
setting of meaningful, attainable
goals with the subordinate, which
the superior can coordinate with
the goals he has established for
himself, may require a sharpening
of communication skills and a
greater use of creativity by the
manager.
Three stages

The author presents a case study
of a medium-size firm which has
been implementing an MBO man
agerial system. There are three
stages to its program of organiza
tional change.
The first stage began with a
series of one-week training semi
nars which were attended by all
managers beginning from the top
and moving down. No superior
subordinate pairs attended the
same seminar. This gave the par
ticipants an opportunity to voice
their personal concerns with the
proposed changes. The theme of
the seminar was how to increase the
individual’s effectiveness in the
work environment. The order of
attendance, top-management first,
was important since as a manager
returned from the seminar, his su
perior could reinforce the man
ager’s attitude toward change.
The second stage of the pro
gram was a series of three-day,
team-building seminars attended
by a manager and his immediate
subordinates. The theme of these
seminars was the role of the “team”
in the organization and the role of
each member on the team. The first
stage produced a favorable atti
tude towards change by relating it
to increased effectiveness and the
second stage built upon this foun
dation by specification of team ob
jectives which would lead to in
creased effectiveness. The team con
cept was reinforced as each man
ager met with his immediate sub
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ordinates and, in turn, each of
these subordinates met with his
immediate subordinates. This de
vice provided a “linking-pin” ef
fect as each individual participated
on two teams, first as a subordinate
and then as a superior. This also
provided continuity of goal struc
ture through the organization.
The third stage involved meet
ings between the superior and each
individual subordinate to establish
a clear set of objectives for each
subordinate. Also, a precise plan of
action designed to achieve the ob
jectives was mutually agreed upon.
This third stage must be developed
in an atmosphere of mutual trust
and the goals should be attainable
or the previous two stages will be
worthless.
It is the third stage which pre
sents the greatest challenge to to
day’s managers but this stage is
essential to the individual’s accept
ance or rejection of the MBO man
agerial system. The experiences
from the first two stages must be
such that openness to change has
been rewarding and that this open
ness is backed by top management.
Bichard E. Baker
The University of Wisconsin
Madison

Introducing a New Work Mea
surement System-MODAPTS by
Robert J. Shaw, Management Con
trols, April, 1971.

This article describes a new sys
tem similar in nature to MethodsTime Measurement (MTM), which
was developed in the 1940s to ob
jectively determine the length of
time a job should take. The author
is a principal in the New York of
fice of the accounting firm of Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., which is
one of the two licensees of this Aus
tralian-designed system.

There are two basic work mea
surement methods in industrial use
today—stop watch time study and
predetermined time standard (PTS)
systems, such as MTM and Master

Standard Data. The fact that stop
watch studies are still widely used
is an indication that there must be
some dissatisfaction with the PTS
systems currently available and that
a substantial market exists for a
new system which would avoid the
sources of this dissatisfaction.
Simplicity, productivity claimed

The advantages claimed for stop
watch measurement over current
PTS systems are mainly in terms of
simplicity and productivity (the
rate of producing standards). These
are precisely the areas of improve
ment claimed by Mr. Shaw for
MODAPTS (Modular Arrangement
of Predetermined Time Standards).
This system was not designed to
give more accurate time standards,
but to improve the simplicity and
efficiency of use, while maintaining
a reasonable level of accuracy. Only
21 basic body movement activities
are defined in this method, as com
pared to hundreds in other PTS
systems. Supposedly, the expression
of all possible body movements in
terms of multiples of a simple finger
movement called a MOD can ade
quately allow this condensation of
categories without serious loss of
comprehension. Unfortunately, the
reader will either have to accept
this on faith or avail himself of the
services of PMM & Co., because
the evidence contained in the arti
cle is limited to a statement that
“tests and instructional experiences
support the reports of users that
the benefits of MODAPTS are sim
plicity of training, ease of applica
tion, economy of operation, im
proved understanding of controls,
and development of standards of a
high level of accuracy.”
If we tentatively accept the con
tention that the accuracy is ade
quate, we can look more closely
at the claimed advantages of sim
plicity and efficiency of operation.
MODAPTS does not require the use
of highly skilled technical personnel
and includes a programed instruc
tion manual designed to provide
an adequate training course which
can be completed in one week.
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Along with an explanation of the
MODAPTS data card, the manual
helps the trainee to recognize and
properly classify body activities in
order to apply the appropriate
MOD value. It also covers such
topics as the philosophy of work
measurement, allowances, standard
data development, and labor re
porting. The author claims that
once proficiency is attained through
a few days of actual experience
following the training program, the
“average analyst” can develop con
sistent time standards within min
utes after observing or simulating
an operation—sometimes even
matching the speed of the stop
watch method.
If the speed and simplicity of
the stop watch method can be ap
proached, a PTS method would
be clearly attractive because the
former only works from observation
and is not likely to lead to methods
improvement opportunities such as
can be developed from the detailed
movement pattern information that
can be generated by use of PTS
systems. If MODAPTS can deliver
the advantages claimed by its
sellers, it may well have a receptive
market.
Donald H. Wort
Michigan State University

The Credit Card’s Painful Com
ing-of-Age by Irwin Ross, For

tune, October, 1971.

Irwin Ross delves into the $10billion credit card industry and re
lates some of the major problems
in system and operation that still
have it looking for respectable
profits.

The author traces the history of
the credit-card revolution from the
brainchild of the late Frank X. Mc
Namara, who founded Diners’ Club
in 1950, to date. Today there are
275 million credit cards of all
types: 55 million bank cards, 90
million oil company cards, 120 mil
lion retail store cards, and 11.8 mil
lion miscellaneous cards for travel,
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entertainment, and car hire. In
1970, charges topped $7 billion on
bank cards alone.
In spite of its many triumphs,
the industry profits have been elu
sive. Diners’ Club lost over $70
million in the last 27 months. Carte
Blanche lost $2,675,000 in 18
months and finally emerged in the
black last June. American Express
speaks of increasing profits but the
figures are buried in the overall
accounts. The banks too, have been
losing money. Wells Fargo lost
$7,000,000 from its card introduc
tion in 1967 through 1970. Modest
profits are now expected. New
York’s Bankers Trust lost $5.4 mil
lion in 1969, $3 million in 1970, and
$1,200,000 in the first six months of
1971. In 1960, when the Bank of
America started its statewide op
eration, it lost almost $9 million.
Accounting confusion

Only the bank and T and E
(travel and entertainment) cards
were intended to return a profit.
Oil company and department store
cards are used primarily as market
ing tools.
The accounting techniques util
ized vary among the banks and the
T and E companies to such an ex
tent as to make comparisons diffi
cult. Some banks charge their card
operations for the use of money,
others do not. American Express
does not publish separate profit
figures for its card operations al
though billings are known ($2.3 bil
lion in 1970). Translating volume
into bottom-line earnings is a tricky
job involving many variables in
revenue and expenses that are
rarely found in other businesses.
These are often erratic and extra
ordinarily difficult to control. Some
card companies charge the card
holder, some charge the merchant,
some charge both. Still others
charge carrying charges on unpaid
balances.
One of the most acute problems
of the credit card business is dead
beats. The general economic de
cline of 1969-70 resulted in an
enormous increase in delinquencies

which accounted for much of
Diners’ and Carte Blanche’s deficit.
Banks and oil companies used mass
unsolicited mailings as the cheap
est way to build their rosters. This
compounded their credit-loss prob
lems. Another problem is fraud. A
credit card is highly portable and
valuable. Many cards are stolen
from the U.S. mails and credit card
companies as well as individuals.
Many are sold on the black market.
Many cardholders go on buying
sprees. One gang took Diners’ Club
for $621,000.
Many of the profit problems ap
pear to emanate from inadequate
planning, inadequate systems, and
insufficient thought given to ade
quate controls. As the author states,
... in this high-volume, highvelocity business, a slippage of con
trol quickly leads to disaster.” Most
of the companies and banks have
taken steps to remedy their prob
lems. Some bypass the post office
and require customers to pick up
their new cards at the bank. Com
puter systems have been sophisti
cated to call attention to buying
sprees. Others have strengthened
credit investigations and set more
stringent credit limits. Merchant
“print-outs” are being published
more frequently to detect fraudu
lent purchases or collusion.
For 1970, banks in the Federal
Reserve system reported write-offs
of 3.39 per cent compared to 2.38
per cent in 1969. The trend is now
down with Bank of America report
ing 1.77 per cent for its first quarter
of 1971 as compared to 2.4 per cent
in its last quarter of 1970.
Under the direction of good
management, credit and fraud los
ses are coming under control and
potential profits begin to loom on
the horizon. As the author states:
In the early stages of a
credit-card program, the em
phasis is on marketing . . . Pro
per paperwork procedures and
adequate controls come later,
after management is shocked
by high losses.
The author concludes that the
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going has been tough for the banks
because of the resistance of cus
tomers to the 18 per cent carrying
charge. Some banks are proposing
a yearly fee for the card. On the
other hand, many bankers consider
their credit card venture as the
R & D project toward the “Cashless
Society.”
Raises questions

The article is well written and
should be of interest to all systems
analysts, public and private ac
countants, and executives contem
plating entering the volume credit
card arena. The article raises many
important questions that must be
answered if any such venture is to
be profitable. Why should there be
heavy credit losses the first five
years? Many department stores and
mail order companies have had
successful credit operations. What
is their secret? Many major compu
ter installations venture into new
systems without adequate manage
ment participation, thus leaving
many major decisions in the hands
of technicians. Certainly adequate
planning and proper utilization of
modern tools to weigh the pros and
cons of various courses of action
should be a “must” in any major
venture. Accountants would obvi
ously be interested in the effects of
such ventures on the proper valua
tion of receivables and potential
losses in the financial statements.
Aren A. Lewis
University of Southern California

Long-Run Curves: A Comment
by Robert W. Mitchell, The Jour
nal of Industrial Economics, No
vember, 1971, and Cost Function,
Concentration, and Barriers to
Entry in Twenty-Nine Manufac
turing Industries of India: A
Comment and Reinterpretation
by John A. Walgreen, The Journal
of Industrial Economics, Novem
ber, 1971.

In the absence of theoretically
perfect data, economists use ac
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counting and other available infor
mation—and sometimes arrive at
different conclusions from the same
data.
A survey of 29 manufacturing in
dustries was made by Vinod K.
Gupta using the information avail
able from the Census of Indian
Manufacturers. His findings, pub
lished in The Journal of Industrial
Economics, have attracted critical
comments from other economists
and a reinterpretation of the data
used by Gupta has led one of them
to arrive at a widely different con
clusion.
The first conclusion drawn by
Gupta in his article was that in a
large majority of the industries un
der study, the long-term cost curve
is either L-shaped or linear, and it
is U-shaped in a very few indus
tries. This means that in a majority
of industries economies of scale ex
ist, but diseconomies of scale do
not exist. Even though this finding
is corroborated by findings in many
industries in other countries also,
it is in sharp contrast with the tra
ditional assumption made by eco
nomic theorists about a U-shaped
long-term cost curve, and has been
objected to by one of Gupta’s two
commentators.
Normal returns not considered

Robert W. Mitchell points out
various limitations which must be
placed on the above mentioned
conclusion. One of the points made
by him is that in calculating costs
Gupta has made no allowance for
a “normal” rate of return on invest
ment. Gupta, however, thinks that
the theoretical concept of normal
profits is not operational, nor is
their inclusion in costs essential to
a study of cost comparisons at dif
ferent scales of production in an
industry. Mitchell also points out
the possibility that scale economies
may be absorbed as “managerial
slack” and thus not appear in cost
data.
Gupta’s second finding relates to
the desirability of concentration
and monopoly power. He concludes

that if we want efficiency in pro
duction and distribution, the pres
ent degree of concentration and
monopoly power cannot be avoided
in most of the industries in which
it exists significantly.
Gupta also found that in a large
majority of industries, barriers to
entry due to the presence of scale
economies are not very strong.
From his analysis, however, he
could not arrive at a firm conclu
sion about the existence of a posi
tive association between the rate
of profit and the height of these
barriers to entry.
High barrier, large profits

John A. Walgreen undertook a
reinterpretation of the data used
by Gupta and arrived at a signifi
cantly different conclusion in this
matter. He regrouped the industries
according to their concentration
ratio. On this basis, he found that
the average profit rate of the group
of industries having “very impor
tant” economies of scale was 50
per cent larger than the average
profit rate of the group of indus
tries where economies of scale were
only “moderately important” or “un
important.” These results are con
sistent with those obtained in cer
tain studies of United States indus
tries. Walgreen, therefore, con
cludes that the height of the bar
rier to entry may be an important
structural determinant of industrial
performance in less developed
countries, as well as in developed
countries.
Surendra P. Agrawal
University of Florida
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